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RELEASED IN PART

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ACTION AF-01

1.4(B), 1.4(D)

INFO	LOG-00	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00	EUR-01	HA-09
	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00
	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-00	/024W	
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O 111521Z DEC 92
 FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2499
 AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
 INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIGALI 05137

PARIS FOR PERLOW AND A/S COHEN FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, FR, RW
 SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH FRENCH ON RWANDA

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

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 2. SHOULD THERE BE TIME DURING A/S COHEN'S MEETINGS
 WITH THE FRENCH, IT WOULD BE USEFUL HERE TO HEAR THE
 PARIS PERSPECTIVE ON EVENTS THAT ARE HAPPENING AND
 NOT HAPPENING IN RWANDA AND THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE FRENCH

3. THE RPF IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY SHRILL ABOUT
 FRENCH BEHAVIOR IN RWANDA. SOMEHOW THE FRENCH HAVE
 BEEN FINGERED AS THE OBSERVERS WHO LED TO THE

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SUSPENSION OF THE TALKS IN ARUSHA LAST WEEK. IN ADDITION, THEY ARE ACCUSED OF ALL MANNER OF ASSISTANCE TO THE RWANDAN ARMY, HELPING IT PREPARE FOR AN ATTACK ON THE RPF, AND PROPPING UP HABYARIMANA SO HE CAN DEAL AS HE WISHES WITH HIS INTERNAL OPPOSITION.

4. AS WE KNOW, THE FRENCH PRESENCE HERE IS SMALL, AND IN PRINCIPLE NOT COMBAT ORIENTED. THE MOST RECENT ACCUSATIONS OF PROBLEMS ALONG THE CEASEFIRE LINE APPARENTLY RELATE TO THE ACTIVITIES OF SEVEN RPT SEVEN FRENCH OFFICERS AND NONCOMS WHO ARE TRAINING THE FAR IN PREPARING DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.

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5.

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KIGALI PERSPECTIVE

6. IN SPITE OF THE CRISIS ATMOSPHERE IN KIGALI SINCE THE MIDDLE OF OCTOBER OVER HOW TO DIVIDE UP POWER IN

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THE GOVERNMENT BETWEEN HABYARIMANA AND HIS OPPONENTS, WE STILL BELIEVE THAT A COMPROMISE IS POSSIBLE. WE ARE NOT YET READY TO ABANDON THE SEARCH FOR A CONSENSUS. THIS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON OUR CONCLUSION THAT A BREAKDOWN IN THE PROCESS WILL LEAD TO CHAOS WHICH IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST. THE OPPOSITION PARTIES CANNOT PROCEED WITHOUT INVOLVING THE MRND IN CONFIDENTIAL

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THE GOVERNMENT, BECAUSE THEY FEAR THE ALMOST UNLIMITED POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE OF THE FORMER SINGLE PARTY AND ITS CDR ALLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY APPARENTLY RECOGNIZE THAT THEY ARE NOT CAPABLE OF GOING BACK TO WAR, AND THAT, MUCH AS THEY DON'T LIKE THE PROSPECT, THEIR ONLY REAL SOLUTION IS IN MAKING PEACE WITH THE RPF AND THEIR INTERNAL ALLIES.

FRENCH POLICY?

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8. THERE IS ALSO A RUMOR FLOATING IN KIGALI THAT
PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA WILL SEEK AN AUDIENCE WITH
PRESIDENT MITTERAND IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO. THE

[REDACTED] 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

IS AWARE OF THE SAME RUMOR.

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INCREASINGLY

1.4(B), 1.4(D)

ONE HEARS PEOPLE TALKING ABOUT THE LIBERIA OR SOMALIA
FACTORS IN THE RWANDAN CONTEXT.

10. I DO NOT BELIEVE THE FRENCH ARE YET WILLING TO
GIVE UP ON HABYARIMANA, OR TO MAKE THE HIGHLY
SYMBOLIC GESTURE OF WITHDRAWING THEIR SUPPORT FOR HIS
MILITARY FORCES. BUT I DO THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL

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TO HEAR PARIS' VIEWS ON THE FOLLOWING:

A. TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT
HABYARIMANA IS SINCERELY INTERESTED IN MOVING RWANDA
TOWARD DEMOCRACY.

B. DO THE FRENCH BELIEVE THAT THE RWANDAN ARMY HAS
THE CAPABILITY TO CONTINUE THE WAR, OR, MORE
SIGNIFICANTLY, TO GO ON THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE RPF?

C. WHAT IS THE FRENCH VIEW OF THE MILITARY
CAPABILITY OF THE RPF?

D. ALL THE OBSERVERS ARE BECOMING IMPATIENT WITH THE
PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN ARUSHA. DO THE FRENCH
HAVE ANY SENSE FOR HOW LONG THE PROCESS CAN DRAG ON
WITHOUT A TOTAL BREAKDOWN?

E. SHOULD THE ARUSHA PROCESS BREAK DOWN, WHAT OTHER
OPTIONS ARE AVAILABLE TO THE OBSERVER COMMUNITY?

F. IS IT POSSIBLE FOR A CEASEFIRE TO CONTINUE
INDEFINITELY WITH NEGOTIATIONS SUSPENDED AND INTERNAL
POLITICS CONTINUING TO BUBBLE ALONG.

G. HAVE THE FRENCH GIVEN ANY RECENT THOUGHT TO THE
LONG-TERM MDR DEMAND FOR A NATIONAL CONFERENCE,
SHOULD THE PRESENT PROCESS NOT SUCCEED? FLATEN

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